Systematic checkpointing of the machine state makes roll-back and restart of execution from a safe state possible upon detection of an error. The energy overhead of checkpointing, however, as incurred by storage and communication of the machine state, grows with the frequency of checkpointing. Amortizing this overhead becomes especially challenging, considering the growth of expected error rates as an artifact of contemporary technology scaling, as checkpointing frequency tends to increase with increasing error rates. At the same time, due to imbalances in technology scaling, recomputing data can become more energy efficient than storing and retrieving precomputed data. Recomputation of data (which otherwise would be read from a checkpoint) can reduce the frequency of checkpointing along with the data size to be checkpointed, and thereby mitigate checkpointing overhead. This paper quantitatively characterizes a recomputation-enabled checkpointing framework which can reduce the storage overhead of checkpointing by up to 23.91%; the performance overhead by up to 11.92%, and the energy overhead by up to 12.53%,
Introduction
Scalable checkpointing is the key to enable emerging highperformance computing applications. These applications challenge processing capabilities, ready to expand their problem sizes as more hardware resources (e.g., more cores under weak scaling) become available. More hardware resources translate into more components subject to errors, which, along with a higher expected component error rate as an artifact of technology scaling, results in a higher probability of (systemwide) errors. Therefore, proper error detection and recovery becomes a must for successful completion of any execution.
Systematic (often, periodic) checkpointing of the machine state enables backward error recovery (BER) upon detection of an error, by rolling back and restarting execution from a safe (i.e., error-free and consistent) state. Both, storage and communication overhead of the checkpointed machine state, however, grow with the frequency of checkpointing. The expected increase in error rates makes amortization of this overhead especially challenging, as a higher probability of error directly implies more frequent checkpointing and recovery.
The overhead of BER spans the overhead of checkpointing and the overhead of roll-back + restart. The time or energy overhead of checkpointing, o chk applies every time the system generates a checkpoint; the time and energy overhead of recovery, o rec , every time the execution restarts from the most recent checkpointed state after detection of an error. o chk is proportional to the time or energy spent on storing the checkpointed state, o wr,chk , and the number of checkpoints, # chk (or checkpointing frequency). The checkpointing overhead then becomes o chk = # chk × o wr,chk . The recovery overhead, o rec includes the time or energy (spent on useful work and) lost since the last checkpoint, o waste and the time or energy spent on restoring the state of the last checkpoint, o roll−back . Therefore, under an error rate of perr, which dictates the number of recoveries, the recovery overhead becomes o rec = perr × (o waste + o roll−back ).
Depending on the level of interaction among parallel tasks of execution during checkpointing and recovery, checkpointing and recovery schemes typically form two major classes: coordinated and uncoordinated. Coordinated schemes enforce tight lock-step coordination (synchronization) among all parallel tasks every time the system generates a checkpoint or triggers recovery, and hence, generally incur a higher overhead. Uncoordinated schemes mitigate this overhead by omitting coordination or confining it only to tasks interacting with each other during computation, which as a downside complicates the establishment of a consistent error-free global state. In this study, we focus on global coordinated checkpointing and recovery, but provide a sensitivity analysis and discussion for local uncoordinated schemes, as well.
Imbalances in technology scaling render data recomputation more energy efficient than storing and retrieving precomputed data. Recomputation of a data value, which otherwise would be read from a checkpoint, can therefore reduce both the frequency of checkpointing, and the data size to be checkpointed. In this paper, we investigate how recomputing data values (instead of checkpointing) can help reduce the checkpointing and recovery overhead. The basic idea is to eliminate an entire checkpoint (or some values to be checkpointed) by relying on the ability to recompute the respective data values when needed during recovery. Thereby, recomputation can mitigate the overhead of checkpointing in terms of time, energy, and storage along with the associated overhead of recovery. Under recomputation, time or energy spent on storing the checkpointed state, o wr,chk decreases since not all of the updated memory values needs to be checkpointed. This in turn decreases o chk , even if # chk remains the same. However, the recovery overhead o rec now has to incorporate the overhead of recomputing (values which were systematically skipped during checkpointing), o rcmp . Still, we expect the time (or energy) spent on restoring the state of the last checkpoint, o roll−back to decrease, since the size of checkpoints would simply reduce under recomputation. Therefore, the recovery overhead becomes: This study quantitatively characterizes the effectiveness of recomputation in mitigating the checkpointing and recovery overhead, and introduces a practical recomputation-enabled checkpointing and recovery scheme, ReCHK. The proof-ofconcept ReCHK design to be presented is:
• hybrid (hardware/software): ReCHK relies on a compiler pass to generate (and embed into the binary) instructions required to recompute the respective data values, which can be excluded from checkpointing. In case of an error, ReCHK's runtime scheduler triggers recomputation of such values. • transparent: Both recomputation-enabled binary generation and triggering recomputation upon recovery are transparent to the application developer and user. • low overhead: The main promise of recomputation is to mitigate the checkpointing overhead, while keeping the recomputation-incurred overheads (particularly during recovery) relatively low. • scalable: Traditional checkpointing and recovery becomes more challenging at larger scale. Recomputation-enabled checkpointing can effectively reduce the checkpointing and recovery frequency along with the storage requirement, hence, is more scalable. As a result, ReCHK can reduce the checkpointing overhead significantly, while keeping the recovery overhead modest. In the following, we will detail ReCHK specifics.
Background

Backward Error Recovery
Checkpointing: Checkpointing serves establishment of a safe (i.e., error-free and consistent) machine state to roll-back to and recover from upon detection of a fault, thereby ensuring forward progress in execution in the presence of errors. Without loss of generality, we consider shared memory manycores featuring directory-based cache coherence. We start our analysis with global coordinated checkpointing and recovery [16, 18, 19] , but provide a sensitivity study for local uncoordinated schemes, as well. Under global checkpointing, all cores periodically cooperate to checkpoint the respective machine state. Specifically, at the beginning of each check- pointing period, all cores stop computation to participate in checkpoint generation. Further, not to favor the proposed recomputation-enabled checkpointing scheme we use a logbased incremental in-memory checkpointing variant similar to [1, 18, 19] as a baseline for comparison, which incurs a lower overhead by construction. In this case, upon each memory update, a record for the old value goes into a log stored in memory. This log corresponds to the checkpoint. The log constitutes a record of values updated only within the time window between two consecutive checkpointing events, as opposed to the entire machine state. Establishing a checkpoint involves writing all dirty cache lines back to memory and recording the content of each core's architectural state. For dirty lines, the memory controller only updates the log with the corresponding old value, if the update represents the very first modification since the last checkpoint. Thus, similar to [18] , a modified cache line gets logged only once between a pair of consecutive checkpoints. The directory controller keeps an additional bit per memory line to keep track of whether the line has already been logged for the current checkpoint interval. The controller sets this bit upon logging the line, and clears it upon establishing a new checkpoint.
In-memory checkpointing by construction incurs a lower time and energy overhead when compared to (more traditional) checkpointing to secondary storage. In-memory checkpointing may correspond to a stand-alone checkpointing scheme or represent the first level in a hieararchical checkpointing framework. Our observations generally apply under both options. Error Detection and Recovery: In the following, we assume a fail-stop error model, where data memory and checkpoint logs do not suffer from any faults, similar to [1] . Various protection mechanisms such as ECC [11] or memory raiding [9] can achieve this. To detect faults, the system can rely on modular redundancy [17] or error detection codes (e.g., CRC).
Error detection is not instantaneous, therefore, a lag between the occurrence of an error and its detection generally applies, which is referred to as error detection latency. As a consequence, corrupted state may get checkpointed, even if the fault detection latency is no longer than the checkpoint period. Figure 1 illustrates an example, where a fault occurs right before Ckpt2 gets taken, and is detected only after Ckpt2 is established, thereby corrupting the respective checkpointed state. In this particular case, the time elapsed between establishment of Ckpt2 and the detection of the fault is less than the error detection latency, hence, there is no guarantee for Ckpt2 to be error-free. To recover from the fault the system should roll-back to the second most recent checkpoint at hand, i.e., Ckpt1, instead of the most recent Ckpt2. If the fault detection latency is no longer than the checkpoint period, which applies throughout this study, keeping most recent two checkpoints suffices to handle such scenarios.
Data Recomputation for Energy Efficiency
The basic idea behind data recomputation is to eliminate memory accesses (be it a read, or a write) by relying on the ability to recalculate the respective data value, when needed. To this end, the system needs to keep track of the respective chain of (dependent) instructions which can produce such data values. As a representative example, the recently proposed Amnesiac machine [2] details compiler and (micro)architecture support for opportunistic substitution of memory reads with a chain of arithmetic/logic instructions to recompute the data values which would otherwise be retrieved from the memory hierarchy. Following Amnesiac's terminology, we will refer to these chains of dependent instructions as RSlices, each forming a backward slice of instructions. To perform recomputation along an RSlice, its input operands should be available at the expected time of invocation. Not all RSlice input operands suit themselves to (re)generation by recomputation, particularly, if input operands correspond to read-only values residing in memory (e.g., program inputs), or register values which are overwritten at the time of recomputation. Amnesiac refers to such input operands as non-recomputable inputs, and to make sure that they are available at the time of recomputation, stores them in designated buffers. To facilitate recomputation, we assume similar hardware-software support as Amnesiac, with Section 3 detailing the fundamental differences.
Recomputation-Enabled Checkpointing and Recovery
In this section, we discuss how data recomputation support can be exploited and orchestrated with checkpointing mechanism. Then, we explain the necessary actions of recovery process in recomputation enabled checkpointing when the fault is detected.
Recomputation Enabled Checkpointing
The ReCHK runtime scheduler records a particular RSlice into History Table (Hist), and it requests memory controller to set the bit used for deciding if a given value should be logged. Hist is a small sized buffer that keeps the addresses of RSlices and the destination addresses of the values. The semantic of setting this bit is letting memory controller know that the given value v has corresponding RSlice(v) and it can be recomputed when it is needed (i.e. in recovery). When memory controller receives such a request, it sets the bit and excludes the value v from the consideration of storing it into a checkpoint for that interval. Eventually, the size of checkpoint reduces as more values have RSlices.
The RSlices and the input operands have to remain in Hist as long as the established checkpoint for the given interval is stored in memory. In case of a fault, the global state must be restored in coordination with the established checkpoint and RSlices in Hist. The RSlices will be used to recompute the values that were not checkpointed. Assuming fault detection latency being no more than the checkpointing period, we should retain the most recent two checkpoints. Similarly, Hist should retain the RSlices and input operands for the most recent two checkpoints.
Recomputation Enabled Recovery
When a fault is detected, the most recent error-free consistent global recovery line should be built by restoring the checkpoint. Under recomputation-enabled checkpointing, the values being excluded from checkpoint will be recomputed. Note that there is no need to maintain a separate bookkeeping for the values missing from checkpoint, since Hist records the corresponding RSlices. After recomputing the missing values and storing them back to their destination addresses, the remaining states in the checkpoint can be restored and execution then resumes starting from this point onward.
Microarchitecture Support for Recomputation-Enabled Checkpointing
To exploit the potential of recomputation-enabled checkpointing, the underlying microarchitecture should provide the necessary support for recomputation, similar to [2] .
The performance and energy overhead of recomputation could easily outweigh the benefits if RSlices become excessively large. To prevent this, a threshold can be set for the maximum number of instructions per RSlice, which the compiler takes into account this threshold to filter in embedding RSlices into the binary.
The memory controller should be extended, similar to [18] , to maintain a bit for determining if the old value of a given write-back should be logged. For each write-back request, the memory controller has to determine (i) whether the request would result in the first update to the respective memory line since the last checkpoint was taken, and (ii) whether the current data value v of the respective memory line (i.e., the value before the write-back takes place) can be recomputed. While memory controller can maintain the bit itself for (i), it should cooperative with the ReCHK runtime scheduler for (ii). The ReCHK runtime scheduler should send a request to memory controller and let it know the given value v can be recomputed, so it should not be checkpointed. The memory controller sets the bit when it receives the request from runtime scheduler.
The number of (stores corresponding to the) values that can be excluded from checkpointing depends on the size of the Hist, i.e., how many RSlices the Hist can keep track of. Fortunately, we do not need to have an excessively large Hist to this end: Recall that we only need to checkpoint the old values on the very first write-backs (to unique addresses) when a new checkpoint is established. Therefore, the number of RSlices is not a function of how many times an address is updated, but how many unique memory address is updated within a given checkpoint interval. Naturally, the latter is bounded by the period of checkpointing. As the period gets longer, the probability of having a higher number of unique memory addresses updated increases. At the same time, as the period gets longer, the amount of useful work lost upon detection of a fault increases. The checkpointing period cannot get too long to reduce this amount of useful work lost. The checkpointing period hence puts an upper bound on how many unique RSlices can be encountered at runtime.
Overheads
Recomputation can reduce the amount of values to be logged for checkpoint, so the performance overhead of checkpointing is likely to reduce. On the other hand, RSlices to recompute the missing values in checkpoint have to be recorded in Hist that can be performed in parallel to the other operations. So, Hist update latency can be hidden; however, there would be energy overhead of updating Hist.
The size of checkpoint (i.e. storage overhead) reduces under recomputation enabled checkpointing since the number of values checkpointed shrinks. Such a reduction in checkpoint size can be reflected on energy saving as well as performance gain due to less amount of memory read/write operations (for recovery and checkpoint, respectively).
When a fault is detected, recovery is performed that includes the recomputation of missing values from the checkpoint and restoring the rest of the states in checkpoint. Recomputation incurs a performance overhead; however,it is not prohibitive since the number of instructions in the RSlices are bounded. Although recomputation introduces extra overhead for recovery, it reduces the number of values to be restored. The performance benefit of having smaller set of values to be restored may or may not be comparable to the overhead of recomputation. However, considering the number of checkpoints and the number of recoveries, one can argue that recovery is less frequent event compared to checkpoint, so the performance benefits of recomputation overweight its overhead (due to recovery).
Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the impact of recomputation on checkpointing and recovery, we experimented with eight benchmarks from NAS [3] suite (excluded ep due to technical difficulties on running it on simulation environment). We run the benchmarks with 8 threads on simulated 8-core system that mimics (Intel's Xeon Phi like) an in-order core, running at 1.09GHz, with a private L1 and shared L2 cache. We extended Snipersim [7] to facilitate recomputation, as well as checkpointing and recovery mechanism we propose. The energy measurements are extracted from McPAT [13] that is integrated with the Snipersim. Table 1 summarizes the main configuration of the core and the system.
We implemented the greedy compiler pass to generate a recomputation-enabled binary as a Pin [14] tool. We used a predetermined threshold for RSlice length: the RSlices exceeding the given threshold are not included into binary (to prohibit expensive RSlices).
For the evaluation, we used a baseline that we assume faultfree execution without any checkpointing (No_Ckpt). Then, we modeled two configurations for global checkpointing: i) periodic checkpointing, fault-free execution (Ckpt_NF); ii) periodic checkpointing, fault-incurred execution (Ckpt_F). In Ckpt_NF configuration, we modeled the mechanism of coordinated global checkpointing. In this configuration, we assume there is no fault, so we can clearly see the overhead of global checkpointing. In Ckpt_F configuration, in addition to coordinated global checkpointing, we also modeled the mechanism of recovery when a fault occurs.
To characterize the impact of recomputation-enabled checkpointing and recovery, we also modeled the following two configurations: i) recomputation-enabled periodic checkpointing, fault-free execution (Rec_Ckpt_NF); ii) recomputationenabled periodic checkpointing, fault-incurred execution (Rec_Ckpt_F). In Rec_Ckpt_NF configuration, we incorporated recomputation into the global checkpointing where the size of checkpoint can be reduced due to the eliminated values that can be recomputed in case of a need (i.e. in recovery). Since we assume fault-free execution for this configuration, we can clearly see the impact of recomputation on checkpoint size and its governing overheads. In Rec_Ckpt_F configuration, we modeled the recomputation-enabled recovery (assuming a fault occurs) in addition to checkpointing. The configurations that are modeled are summarized in Table 2 . Based on the expected error rate and execution time, we set the checkpointing frequency for benchmarks to checkpoint 100 times for benchmarks where execution time is longer (i.e. bt, cg, lu, and sp), and 25 times for benchmarks where execution time is relatively shorter (i.e. dc, ft, is, and mg). The checkpoint intervals are uniformly distributed over the execution time. We remind that No_Ckpt does not involve checkpointing, so it is overhead-free baseline.
Evaluation
Checkpointing Overhead in Fault-Free Execution
In this section, we want to present the impact of recomputation on performance, energy and energy-delay product -as a proxy for energy efficiency-(EDP [12] ) of a fault-free execution. We use No_Ckpt as baseline where no checkpointing takes places. Figure 2 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks under Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF configurations. The general trend is that Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF have consistently worse performance compared to No_Ckpt due to the checkpointing overhead. Notice that Rec_Ckpt_NF is very effective in reducing the performance overhead of checkpointing involved in Ckpt_NF˙Rec_Ckpt_NF reduces the performance overhead of Ckpt_NF up to 28.81% (for is), and 11.92%, on average. The smallest reduction is 2.12% for cg. This small reduction is due to the fact that, in cg, the performance overhead of Ckpt_NF is also relatively low. This is because cg has relatively long execution time and the checkpoint size per checkpoint interval is relatively small; the amount of time spent in checkpointing accounts ≈ 9% of total execution time. Figure 3 shows the normalized system energy of benchmarks under Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF configurations. General trend is similar to performance and Rec_Ckpt_NF reduces the energy overhead of checkpointing involved in Ckpt_NF. Rec_Ckpt_NFreduces the energy overhead of Ckpt_NF up to 26.93% (for is), and 12.53%, on average. Among the benchmarks, is benchmark is very amenable to recomputation. Thus, we see that majority of the updates to memory can be recomputed (in case of recovery), so they can be excluded from the checkpoint, providing higher reduction in overhead associated with checkpointing in Ckpt_NF. The smallest energy reduction is 1.75% (for cg) due to the reasoning provided in performance overhead discussion. Figure 4 shows the normalized energy-delay product (EDP) of benchmarks under Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF configurations. We use EDP as metric for evaluating the energy efficiency of the recomputation-enabled checkpointing. Generally, EDP provides a notion of balance between the performance overhead and energy consumption. Rec_Ckpt_NF provides EDP gain up to 47.98% (for is), and 22.47%, on average.
Recovery Overhead in Fault-Occurring Execution
In Section 5.1, we assumed no fault occurs in execution; however, we regularly checkpoint to quantify the pure overhead of checkpointing. Here, we want to quantify the overhead of recovery process, in case of a fault occurs in execution. Recovery requires to establish a globally consistent state among all cores. For Ckpt_F configuration that means each core has to rollback and restore the states kept in most recently established checkpoint. On the other hand, Rec_Ckpt_F configuration requires each core to restore the states kept in most recently established checkpoint, as well as to recompute the values that have been omitted during the time of establishing of checkpoint. Such values were omitted during checkpointing since they have corresponding RSlices which can be triggered to recompute them at a later time. Thus, although Rec_Ckpt_F configuration reduces the checkpointing overhead, it requires extra effort to recompute the missing states.
Similar to analysis in Section 5.1, we use No_Ckpt as baseline where no checkpointing takes places (and we still assume no fault occurs in No_Ckpt). Figure 5 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks under Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F configurations, where we a fault occurs during the execution. The performance overheads of benchmarks under Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F configurations are higher than Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF, respectively. This is because, in addition to checkpointing overhead, Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F include the recovery overhead. Rec_Ckpt_F is very effective in reducing the performance overhead of Ckpt_F. Although Rec_Ckpt_F needs to recompute the missing values, thus incurs additional overhead, reduction of checkpointing overhead (due to the reduced checkpoint size) and reduction of the restore overhead (again, due to the reduced checkpoint size) outweighs the associated overhead of recomputation. For this reason, Rec_Ckpt_F provides a low-cost checkpoint and recovery.
Rec_Ckpt_F reduces the performance overhead of Ckpt_F up to 26.68% (for is), and 12.39%, on average. The smallest reduction is 1.9% for cg. Similar to the previous justification on fault-free execution, this small reduction is due to the fact that, in cg, the performance overhead of Ckpt_F is also relatively low. Figure 6 shows the normalized system energy of benchmarks under Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F configurations. The energy reduction follows the very same trend with the performance overhead reduction. Rec_Ckpt_F reduces the energy overhead of Ckpt_F up to 30% (for dc), and 13.47%, on average. The smallest energy reduction is 1.86% (for cg).
Finally, Figure 7 shows the normalized energy-delay product (EDP) of benchmarks under Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F configurations. Rec_Ckpt_F provides EDP gain up to 48.07% (for dc), and 23.41%, on average. Notice that although is benchmark benefits more from Rec_Ckpt_F in terms of performance, dc benchmark has higher energy gain due to Rec_Ckpt_F; and in turn dc has higher EDP gain.
Data recomputation effectively reduces the associated costs of checkpointing, as well as rollback and recovery. The effectiveness of recomputation-enabled checkpointing highly depends on the low-cost RSlices and how many values can be excluded from checkpoint. The analysis of the impact of RSlice length on checkpoint size reduction is presented in Section 5.8.
Checkpoint and Footprint Size Reduction
The recomputation-enabled checkpointing demonstrates big potential for mitigating the checkpointing overhead, due to its promise of reducing the amount of data to be checkpointed. The reduction of checkpoint size has mainly two implications. The first one is the amount of data to be moved to designated memory area is reduced; thus saving energy and reduces time required to perform copy. Second, the size of a particular checkpoint is shrunk, so the footprint of a checkpoint on memory (i.e. required memory size) can also be reduced. The largest checkpoint among all checkpoints (i.e. maximum size) designates the memory footprint of the checkpoint (we assume the memory space allocated to previous checkpoints can be reclaimed). As recomputation-enabled checkpointing can shrink the size of checkpoint, the memory footprint (i.e. required memory space) may also be shrunk. Such shrinkage on memory requirement may lead to extra energy benefits (e.g. due to less leakage and refresh in case of DRAM). Figure 8 shows the percentage of overall checkpoint size reduction under Rec_Ckpt_NF (w.r.t. to Ckpt_NF). Among all the benchmarks, is benefits the most from recomputation, and overall checkpoint size is reduced by 75.74% under Rec_Ckpt_NF. On the other hand, the benefits are limited for cg, having overall checkpoint size reduction by 6.99% under Rec_Ckpt_NF. The average checkpoint size reduction is 38.31% for the benchmarks under under Rec_Ckpt_NF. The reductions for Rec_Ckpt_F are inlined with the Rec_Ckpt_NF (since having a fault does not change the set of values that can be recomputed and set of values to be checkpointed).
On the other hand, Figure 9 shows the percentage of footprint size reduction under Rec_Ckpt_NF (w.r.t. to Ckpt_NF). Notice that, recomputation-enabled checkpointing can reduce the memory footprint size, if it reduces the size of the checkpoint that is the largest among all checkpoints. If there is no value that can be recomputed within the largest checkpoint, then recomputation can not reduce the footprint size; although it may reduce the total amount of data to be checkpointed. Such a case can be seen in Figure 9 . Among the benchmarks is has very limited footprint reduction (2.04%) under Rec_Ckpt_NF; although it has the highest checkpoint size reduction (see Figure 8 ). For the rest of the benchmarks, dc has the largest footprint size reduction that is 58.3%, and ft has the smallest footprint size reduction that is 0.05%. For ft, this means Rec_Ckpt_NF can reduce the size of largest checkpoint by only 0.05%, while it can reduce the total checkpoint size by 23.27% (see Figure 8 ). Similar to checkpoint size reductions, the footprint size reduction for Rec_Ckpt_F are inlined with the Rec_Ckpt_NF (due to the same argument: a fault does not change the set of values that can be recomputed and set of values to be checkpointed). One factor that directly impacts the overhead of checkpointing is the number of threads involved in execution. As the number of threads increases, the associated costs of checkpointing also increases, since the coordination burden among threads to checkpoint and the amount of states to be checkpointed increases. As a consequence the memory bandwidth requirement increases as multiple threads need to access memory to complete the checkpoint. Recomputation-enabled checkpointing alleviates the overhead of checkpointing and remain effective as the number of threads scales up. To evaluate the effectiveness of recomputation-enabled checkpointing, we experimented with 8-,16-, and 32-threaded executions for the given benchmarks (we increase the core count as we increase the thread count: each thread maps to a separate core). Figure 10 shows the performance overhead of checkpointing under Ckpt_NF configuration, as we increase the thread count from 8 to 32. The bars indicate the performance overhead of Ckpt_NF configuration for a given thread count compared to performance of No_Ckpt for that thread count. As an example, the bar shown as 8-thread under bt indicates the performance overhead of Ckpt_NF running with 8 threads w.r.t. No_Ckpt running with 8 threads. Although there is no specific pattern, checkpointing overhead always remains more than 9% for any thread count. On average, the checkpointing overhead is ≈ 45%, 55%, and 60% for 8-, 16-, and 32-threaded executions, respectively, under Ckpt_NF configuration. Figure 10 makes it clear that the checkpointing overhead is considerable regardless of thread count which motivates us further to exploit data recomputation. Figure 11 shows the percentage of performance overhead reduction when benchmarks running with 8-, 16-, and 32-threads under Rec_Ckpt_NF. The performance overhead is reduced up to 28.81% (for is), 17.78% (for is), and 19.12% (for mg) when running with 8-, 16-, and 32-threads, respectively, under Rec_Ckpt_NF. Average performance overhead reduction is ≈12% for 8-threaded executions, and ≈11% for 16-and 32-threaded executions.
Impact of Thread Count on Checkpointing Overhead
In addition to performance overhead reduction, recomputation-enabled checkpointing reduces the energy overhead as well, resulting better EDP for the benchmarks. Under Rec_Ckpt_NF configuration, the EDP improves up to 47.98% (for is), 31.81% (for dc), and 33.8% (for mg) when running with 8-, 16-, and 32-threads, respectively. Average EDP improvement under Rec_Ckpt_NF configuration is ≈22%, 21% and 20% for 8-, 16-, and 32-threaded executions.
The performance overhead reduction and EDP improvements under Rec_Ckpt_F configuration closely follow the Rec_Ckpt_NF for 8-, 16-, and 32-threaded executions.
Impact of Fault Rate on Recovery Overhead
The fault rate directly dictates the rollback and recovery overhead. As more faults occur, more overhead incurs in execution. For the analysis we showed so far for Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F, we assume a single fault occurs during the course of execution. In this section, we want to extend the analysis for multiple faults and evaluate the overhead reduction promise of data recomputation.
As the fault rate increases (i.e. number of faults occur in execution), we expect to have accumulated overhead due to multiple recoveries needed. We swept the fault rate in a way that the total number of faults occur in execution range between 1 and 5. We uniformly distributed these faults within the execution. Figure 12 shows the normalized execution time under Ckpt_F (w.r.t. No_Ckpt) and the number of faults corresponding to different fault rates are labeled as fault_1 for a single fault, fault_2 for two faults occur during the course of execution, and so on. Not surprisingly, the execution time increases as the fault rate increases. Some benchmarks experience higher performance overhead as the fault rate increases. This is mainly because the execution time under No_Ckpt is relatively small, and the overhead of rollback and recovery proportionally higher. Among the benchmarks, ft suffers the most as its per recovery overhead is relatively high. Figure 13 shows the normalized execution time under Rec_Ckpt_F (w.r.t. No_Ckpt) as the fault rate changes. While the pattern is very similar to Ckpt_F configuration, the over- heads are lower, since overall recovery overhead (including restore the checkpointed values, and recomputing missing values) is considerably low under Rec_Ckpt_F configuration. The performance overhead is reduced up to 26.68% (for is) for single fault, 25.35% (for dc) for two faults, 26.87% (for dc) for three faults, 21.58% (for dc) for four faults, and 19.92% (for is) four five faults occur in execution under Rec_Ckpt_F (w.r.t. Ckpt_F). On average the performance overhead reduction ranges from ≈9% up to 12% for different fault rates under Rec_Ckpt_F.
Similar to performance overhead, the EDP also increases when more fault occurs in the execution. The general trend is similar to performance overhead, but more exacerbate for EDP. Under Rec_Ckpt_F configuration, the EDP improves up to 48.07% (for is) for single fault, 47.77% (for dc) for two faults, 50.04% (for dc) for three faults, 42.99% (for dc) for four faults, 34.99% (for is) four five faults occur in execution. On average EDP improvement ranges from ≈18% up to 24% for different fault rates under Rec_Ckpt_F.
Impact of Checkpoint Frequency on Checkpointing Overhead
The associated overhead of checkpointing is a function of how frequent a checkpoint is established, as well as the amount of states being updated after the most recent checkpoint. Performance and energy overhead of checkpointing increase as the checkpointing frequency increases.
In this section, we analyzed the impact of checkpointing frequency on associated checkpointing overhead, and how data recomputation reacts to varying checkpointing frequencies.
To do so, we vary checkpoint frequency that yields certain number of checkpoints for each benchmark. We set the checkpointing frequency for benchmarks to have 25, 50, 75 and 100 checkpoints. These checkpoints are uniformly distributed over the execution of the benchmarks. Figure 14 shows the normalized execution time of the benchmarks under Ckpt_NF configuration when different checkpoint frequencies are used. In Figure 14 , ckpt_25 represents the checkpoint frequency that yields to have 25 checkpoints for a given benchmark. Similarly, ckpt_50, ckpt_75, and ckpt_100 represent the checkpointing frequencies that yield to have 50, 75 and 100 checkpoints, respectively. The normalization base is No_Ckpt.
Naturally, the performance overhead of checkpointing increases as the checkpoint frequency increases. Among the benchmarks, ft experiences the largest performance overhead under Ckpt_NF configuration. Figure 15 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks under Rec_Ckpt_NF configuration when different checkpoint frequencies are employed. General trend is very similar to Ckpt_NF configuration; however, Rec_Ckpt_NF considerably reduces the performance overhead of checkpointing. An interesting point in Figure 15 is the normalized execution time of ckpt_75 is lower than ckpt_50 for is. Although it seems unintuitive at the first place, there is catch in this case. Notice that when we change checkpointing frequency, the start time of each checkpoint interval becomes different (since we uniformly distribute the checkpoints). The ability of recomputation to reduce the checkpoint size (and checkpoint overhead) depends on whether there exist any RSlice for corresponding checkpoint interval. If the checkpoints fall into the intervals of the execution where the amount of data that can be recomputed (thus can be excluded from checkpoint) is small, then the benefits of recomputation can be limited. Such a corner case occurred in is under ckpt_50. Compared to ckpt_75, the checkpoints under ckpt_50 has limited RSlice coverage, meaning the amount of data to be recomputed (i.e. can be excluded from checkpoint) is smaller. So, Rec_Ckpt_NF with ckpt_50 has higher performance overhead compared to ckpt_75. The performance overhead of Ckpt_NF is reduced up to 28.81% (for is) for ckpt_25, 25.3% (for dc) for ckpt_50, 50.86% (for is) for ckpt_75, and 43.52% (for is) for ckpt_100 under Rec_Ckpt_NF (w.r.t. Ckpt_NF). On average the performance overhead reduction ranges from ≈10% up to 14% for different checkpoint frequencies under Rec_Ckpt_NF.
The similar trend exists for EDP. Figure 16 shows the normalized EDP under Ckpt_NF configuration for different checkpoint frequencies. On the other hand, Rec_Ckpt_NF improves the EDP up to 47.98% (for is) for ckpt_25, 47.74% (for dc) for ckpt_50, 74.19% (for is) for ckpt_75, and 63.45% (for is) for ckpt_100 (w.r.t. Ckpt_NF). On average EDP improvement ranges from ≈20% up to 26% for different checkpoint frequencies under Rec_Ckpt_NF.
Coordinated Local vs. Global Checkpointing
In our discussions and evaluations so far, we focused on global checkpointing. An alternative to global checkpointing is known as coordinated local checkpointing [4, 19] . Main difference of coordinated local checkpointing is that it does not forces all cores to participate in checkpointing. It is necessary to checkpoint and rollback (in case of fault) cores together that have been communicating for a given checkpoint interval. The cores that do not communicate may not need to checkpoint at the time other cores checkpoint. Coordinated local checkpointing is advocated to be scalable due to associated overheads of checkpoint and recovery is a function of the number of cores that communicate with each other. To identify the cores that communicated with each other within a given checkpoint interval, there has to be a mechanism to track inter-core data dependencies. Although coordinated checkpointing has an advantage of having reduced set of cores need to checkpoint together, the disadvantage is that identifying communicating cores needs continuous and dynamic monitoring and recording that may be a challenge for scaling as well.
Without loss of generality, coordinated local checkpointing is, yet another, design point, and in this section we want to evaluate the effectiveness of recomputation-enabled checkpointing for coordinated local checkpointing.
To make a comparison between global and coordinated local checkpointing, we use the Ckpt_NF and Ckpt_F in global checkpointing as normalization points for Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpoint, respectively. Similarly, we use the Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F in global checkpoint as normalization points for Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F in . coordinated local checkpoint, respectively. Figure 17 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks under Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF configurations when coordinated local checkpointing is used. As we can see, coordinated local checkpointing reduces the overhead of Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing for majority of the benchmarks. The reduction of the overhead is due to the shrinkage of number of cores checkpointing together. However, there are benchmarks, including bt, cg and sp, that have not seen any overhead reduction under Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing. This is because mainly all cores communicate with one another, so the number of cores involving in checkpointing remains the same in comparison to global checkpointing. For these benchmarks, we do not observe any sizable reduction in performance overhead under Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing. For the rest of the benchmarks the performance overhead of Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing reduces up to ≈42% for ft, 17% for dc, 36% for is, 32% for mg, and 10% for lu (w.r.t. Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing).
The recomputation-enabled checkpointing in coordinated local checkpointing remains as effective as it is in global checkpointing. For all the benchmarks, the checkpointing overhead introduced by Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing remains below (or at most the same) the overhead of Rec_Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing. The reductions we observe for Rec_Ckpt_NF are not pronounced as much as Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing, mainly because the potential for recomputation does not change considerably. On the other hand, generally the number of values that can not be recomputed (so have to be checkpointed) reduces more than the ones that can be recomputed. For this reason, Ckpt_NF results relatively higher reduction in performance overhead compared to Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing with respect to their global checkpointing counterparts (i.e. Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing, respectively). Among the benchmarks, bt, cg, lu, and sp do not observe any sizable reduction (≈≤ 1%) on performance overhead of Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing. For the rest of the benchmarks the performance overhead of Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing reduces up to ≈8% for dc, 33% for ft, 15% for is, and 26% for mg (w.r.t. Rec_Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing). .
We observe similar trends for EDP for coordinated local checkpointing. Compared global checkpointing, EDP reduces under Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing up to 35.68% for dc, 67.15% for ft, 58.26% for is, 19.99% for lu, and 57.92% for mg (w.r.t. Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing). On the other hand, EDP reduces under Rec_Ckpt_NF in coordinated local checkpointing up to 15.85% for dc, 55.68% for ft, 26.24% for is, and 49.75% for mg (w.r.t. Rec_Ckpt_NF in global checkpointing). Figure 18 shows the normalized execution time of benchmarks under Ckpt_F and Rec_Ckpt_F configurations when coordinated local checkpointing is used. In case of a fault occurs in execution, a rollback and recovery have to be performed. The trends are similar to Ckpt_NF and Rec_Ckpt_NF configurations in coordinated local checkpointing. One difference is the gap between the execution time of benchmarks performing global checkpointing and coordinated checkpointing gets shrunk. We do not observe any sizable reduction in performance overhead of benchmarks bt, cg, lu and sp under Ckpt_F in coordinated local checkpointing. For the rest of the benchmarks the performance overhead of Ckpt_F in coordinated local checkpointing reduces up to ≈14% for ft, 6% for dc, 31% for is, and 2% for mg (w.r.t. Ckpt_F in global checkpointing). On the other hand, the performance overhead of Rec_Ckpt_F in coordinated local checkpointing reduces up to ≈8% for dc, 10% for ft, 9% for is, and 26% for mg (w.r.t. Rec_Ckpt_F in global checkpointing).
Compared global checkpointing, EDP reduces under Ckpt_F in coordinated local checkpointing up to 18.33% for dc, 33.24% for ft, 51.46% for is, and 11.29% for mg (w.r.t. Ckpt_F in global checkpointing). On the other hand, EDP reduces under Rec_Ckpt_F in coordinated local checkpointing up to 15.80% for dc, 23.81% for ft, 17.99% for is, and 47.32% for mg (w.r.t. Rec_Ckpt_F in global checkpointing).
Based on the outcomes of the evaluations in this section, we can conclude that recomputation-enabled checkpointing and recovery in coordinated local checkpointing is as effective as (if not more) in global checkpointing.
Impact of RSlice Length on Checkpoint Size
RSlice length imposes the cost of recomputation. Longer RSlices means higher recomputation cost. In a fault-free ex- ecution, the cost of recomputation may be irrelevant, since recomputation is necessary only when there is a fault and recovery is needed. However, in practice, we have to make sure that the execution can resume after detecting a fault and recovering from it in a low-cost fashion. For our evaluations, we used a threshold of 10 instructions (except is, where threshold is 5) to identify the RSlices to be embedded into binary. Notice that if we have a higher threshold, there may be more RSlices to be included in binary, so the likelihood of having a value that has a corresponding RSlice increases. This means that the number of values that can be recomputed (thus can be eliminated from checkpoint) may increase. As a result the checkpoint size gets reduced. As an example, Figure 19 shows the impact of RSlice length on reduction of total checkpoint size under Rec_Ckpt_NF configuration for bt. The data labels on x axis of the Figure 19 represents the threshold used in selection of RSlices. As an example, the label length_50 means that RSlice can have at most 50 instructions. The total checkpoint size reduces up to 89.91% when RSlice length is allowed to grow up to 50 instructions, and 36.54% when the RSlice length remains less than or equal to 10. One should pay a special attention while choosing the threshold. It has the impact on recomputation cost (during recovery in case of fault), and the microarchitectural support needed to facilitate data recomputation. In our evaluations, we picked conservative threshold to keep the microarchitectural resources needed reasonable (as RSlices length increases, we may need bigger History table), and not to favor recomputation-enabled checkpointing.
We expect the values that have corresponding RSlices and can be recomputed are not uniformly distributed among the checkpoint intervals. This means for each checkpoint interval, we may observe varying levels of benefits from data recomputation. That variation translates into variation on checkpoint size reduction over checkpoint intervals. Figure 20 shows how the effectiveness of recomputation-enabled checkpointing on reducing checkpoint size changes over time for bt (when using different thresholds for RSlice length). We see that Rec_Ckpt_NF reduces checkpoint size more for certain checkpoint intervals compared to other intervals. Such kind of variation can be exploited for improving the impact of recomputation-enabled checkpointing. The checkpointing frequency would be changed dynamically to perform checkpointing when there exist high potential for recomputation (i.e. checkpoint intervals where the number of values that can be recomputed is high). We do not investigate on such kind of dynamic and intelligent scheme in the scope of this paper, rather we just want to motivate for further research on how recomputation-enabled checkpointing can be extended further.
Related Work
The fault-tolerant system design and checkpointing are extensively studied over the decades. The proposed solutions can be categorized into software-based, hardware-based checkpointing; application or system level checkpointing. Softwarebased proposals use periodic barriers to perform systemlevel [10] , application-level [5] , or hybrid checkpoints [15] .
Hardware proposals [1, 18, 19] reduce the checkpoint and restart penalties, but introduce hardware complexity. In Rebound [1] when a core is checkpointing, the L2 controller writes dirty lines back to main memory while keeping the clean copy in L2. Memory controller logs the old value of the updated memory address. In addition, between checkpoint times, when a dirty cache line is written back to memory, memory controller also logs the old value. This is done for the first writeback and consecutive writes to the same memory address can be eliminated from being logged. SafetyNet [19] explicitly checkpoints register file, and incrementally checkpoints the memory state by logging the previous value.
Compiler-assisted checkpointing [6] improves the performance of automated checkpointing by presenting a compiler analysis for incremental checkpointing, aiming to reduce checkpoint size. In incremental checkpointing, the memory updates are monitored and the updates are omitted from checkpointing if it is detected a particular memory location has not been modified between two adjacent checkpoint. This mechanism reduces the amount of data to be checkpointed and widely used in many checkpointing schemes. We also employ incremental checkpointing in our analysis. In [6] , instead of using runtime mechanisms (such as exploiting cache coherency protocol to identify the updates memory locations), they rely on compiler analysis to track the memory updates that can be excluded from checkpoint. To facilitate the compiler analysis, the source code should be manually annotated, indicating the starting point of the checkpoint. However, it has limited applicability in practice, since it may not be always feasible to obtain the source code.
A relevant work presented in [8] , introduces the notion of idempotent execution and corresponding architecture that does not require to have explicit checkpoints to recover from misspeculation or fault. In case of misspeculation or fault it is only necessary to re-execute the idempotent region to recover. Such idempotent regions are constructed by the compiler. As the name suggests, idempotent regions regenerates the same output regardless of how many times it is executed with the given program state. In comparison to our recomputationenabled checkpointing and recovery, idempotent execution has limited flexibility. Generally, idempotent regions are large, meaning they incur high overhead during recovery, while we employ fine-grained data recomputation (separate RSlice for each value), and each RSlice contains only necessary instructions which generally tends be limited in number. Generating idempotent regions is also daunting task. It may not be easy to find and generate fine-grained idempotent regions for the large class of applications which limits the effectiveness of idempotent execution for eliminating checkpointing overheads and minimizing recovery overheads. RSlices provide more flexibility on values to be checkpointed and be recomputed, so our recomputation-enabled checkpoint and recovery scheme has wider applicability. The idempotent execution is also explored in the context of recovering from concurrency bugs [20] . In this work, we study how recomputation can help mitigate the performance and energy overhead of checkpointing, as well as rollback and recovery, assuming a microarchitectural support needed for data recomputation.
Conclusion
In the presence of errors, systematic checkpointing of the machine state makes recovery of execution from a safe state possible. The performance and energy overhead, however, can become overwhelming with increasing frequency of checkpointing and recovery, as dictated by the growth in the frequency of anticipated errors. In this paper, we discuss how recomputation of data values (instead of checkpointing) can help mitigate such overheads. We observe that recomputation can reduce the memory footprint by up to 23.91%. This is accompanied by an improvement in performance, energy and EDP overhead by up to 11.92%, 12.53%, and 23.41%, respectively.
